For pre-prints and other publication access, please see my PhilPapers profile
Metaphysics
(forthcoming). The Rationalist’s Road to Neutral Monism, The Monist.
(forthcoming). Do Vicious Regresses threaten the Principle of Sufficient Reason? Principle of Sufficient Reason, Fatema Amijee and Michael Della Rocca (eds.), Oxford University Press
(2023) Inquiry and Metaphysical Rationalism, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101(4): 809-823.
(2022) The Contingency of Creation and Divine Choice, Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 10: 289-300.
(2021) Explaining Contingent Facts, Philosophical Studies 178(4): 1163-1181.
(2021) Something from Nothing: Why Some Negative Existentials are Fundamental, Non-Being: New Essays on the Metaphysics of Nonexistence, Sara Bernstein and Tyron Goldschmidt (eds.), Oxford University Press.
(2020) Principle of Sufficient Reason, Routledge Handbook of Metaphysical Grounding, Michael Raven (ed.), Routledge.
Invited Work-In-Progress:
Metaphysical Rationalism, Philosophy Compass.
The Possibility of Open-ended Inquiry. Analysis.
Feminist Philosophy and Islam
(2025) An Islamic Foundation for Human Rights. Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Human Rights, Jesse Tomalty and Kerri Woods (eds.), Routledge.
(2023) Towards Epistemic Justice in Islam’, Islamic Philosophy of Religion, Mohammad Saleh Zarepour (ed.), Routledge.
(2023) How to be a Feminist Muslim’, Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9(2), 193-213.
Invited Work-In-Progress:
Modesty as a Virtue in Islam. Liminal Lives: Women Scholars Challenging Boundaries in Theology and Philosophy of Religion, edited by Katherine Dormandy and Gertraud Ladner. Routledge.
Early Modern Philosophy
(forthcoming) Making Sense of Du Châtelet on Physical Influx: Some Kantian Insights. Du Châtelet and Kant: Copernican Turns, Ruth E. Hagengruber and Aaron Wells (eds.), Springer.
(2025) How Did Leibniz’s God Create the World? Journal of Modern Philosophy 7: 1-26.
(2025) Du Châtelet's Causal Idealism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 33 (4): 816-837.
(2025) Du Châtelet’s Rejection of Leibniz’s World Apart Doctrine. Émilie Du Châtelet in Relation to Leibniz and Wolff—Similarities and Differences, Clara Carus and Jeffrey McDonough (eds.), Springer.
(2021) Principle of Sufficient Reason, Encyclopedia of Early Modern Philosophy and the Sciences (Eds. Dana Jalobeanu and Charles T. Wolfe).
Invited Work-In-Progress:
The Necessity of Du Châtelet’s Principle of Sufficient Reason, Émilie Du Châtelet's Scientific Methodology, edited by Peter Anstey and Clara Carus.
History of Analytic Philosophy
(2022) ‘Russell on Propositions’, Routledge Handbook of Propositions, Chris Tillman and Adam Murray (eds.), Routledge. (co-authored with Dominic Alford-Duguid)
(2013) ‘The Role of Attention in Russell’s Theory of Knowledge’, British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (6): 1175-1193. [Winner of the British Society for the History of Philosophy Graduate Essay Prize]
Monograph
Metaphysical Inquiry and the Reach of Reason, under contract with Oxford University Press, New York.
My monograph answers the following broad question: what are the metaphysical commitments of our practice of inquiry? In addressing this question, I argue that a species of inquiry that is central to our investigations cannot begin without metaphysical presuppositions, and so cannot be neutral or open-ended at the outset: when carried out with a rational intention, it encodes substantive metaphysical commitments about the nature of reality. These include a commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason as well as to a variety of idealism on which every explanation is within our epistemic reach. I argue that these commitments significantly constrain which metaphysical positions we can help ourselves to at the beginning of inquiry, as well as which questions we can coherently pursue.
Edited Collections
(forthcoming) Bloomsbury Handbook on Émilie du Châtelet. Bloomsbury Publishing.
(forthcoming) Principle of Sufficient Reason: A History. Oxford University Press. (Edited with Michael Della Rocca)
(2021) Issue of Philosophical Studies on the Principle of Sufficient Reason. (Guest Editor)
Metaphysics
(forthcoming). The Rationalist’s Road to Neutral Monism, The Monist.
(forthcoming). Do Vicious Regresses threaten the Principle of Sufficient Reason? Principle of Sufficient Reason, Fatema Amijee and Michael Della Rocca (eds.), Oxford University Press
(2023) Inquiry and Metaphysical Rationalism, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101(4): 809-823.
(2022) The Contingency of Creation and Divine Choice, Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 10: 289-300.
(2021) Explaining Contingent Facts, Philosophical Studies 178(4): 1163-1181.
(2021) Something from Nothing: Why Some Negative Existentials are Fundamental, Non-Being: New Essays on the Metaphysics of Nonexistence, Sara Bernstein and Tyron Goldschmidt (eds.), Oxford University Press.
(2020) Principle of Sufficient Reason, Routledge Handbook of Metaphysical Grounding, Michael Raven (ed.), Routledge.
Invited Work-In-Progress:
Metaphysical Rationalism, Philosophy Compass.
The Possibility of Open-ended Inquiry. Analysis.
Feminist Philosophy and Islam
(2025) An Islamic Foundation for Human Rights. Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Human Rights, Jesse Tomalty and Kerri Woods (eds.), Routledge.
(2023) Towards Epistemic Justice in Islam’, Islamic Philosophy of Religion, Mohammad Saleh Zarepour (ed.), Routledge.
(2023) How to be a Feminist Muslim’, Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9(2), 193-213.
Invited Work-In-Progress:
Modesty as a Virtue in Islam. Liminal Lives: Women Scholars Challenging Boundaries in Theology and Philosophy of Religion, edited by Katherine Dormandy and Gertraud Ladner. Routledge.
Early Modern Philosophy
(forthcoming) Making Sense of Du Châtelet on Physical Influx: Some Kantian Insights. Du Châtelet and Kant: Copernican Turns, Ruth E. Hagengruber and Aaron Wells (eds.), Springer.
(2025) How Did Leibniz’s God Create the World? Journal of Modern Philosophy 7: 1-26.
(2025) Du Châtelet's Causal Idealism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 33 (4): 816-837.
(2025) Du Châtelet’s Rejection of Leibniz’s World Apart Doctrine. Émilie Du Châtelet in Relation to Leibniz and Wolff—Similarities and Differences, Clara Carus and Jeffrey McDonough (eds.), Springer.
(2021) Principle of Sufficient Reason, Encyclopedia of Early Modern Philosophy and the Sciences (Eds. Dana Jalobeanu and Charles T. Wolfe).
Invited Work-In-Progress:
The Necessity of Du Châtelet’s Principle of Sufficient Reason, Émilie Du Châtelet's Scientific Methodology, edited by Peter Anstey and Clara Carus.
History of Analytic Philosophy
(2022) ‘Russell on Propositions’, Routledge Handbook of Propositions, Chris Tillman and Adam Murray (eds.), Routledge. (co-authored with Dominic Alford-Duguid)
(2013) ‘The Role of Attention in Russell’s Theory of Knowledge’, British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (6): 1175-1193. [Winner of the British Society for the History of Philosophy Graduate Essay Prize]
Monograph
Metaphysical Inquiry and the Reach of Reason, under contract with Oxford University Press, New York.
My monograph answers the following broad question: what are the metaphysical commitments of our practice of inquiry? In addressing this question, I argue that a species of inquiry that is central to our investigations cannot begin without metaphysical presuppositions, and so cannot be neutral or open-ended at the outset: when carried out with a rational intention, it encodes substantive metaphysical commitments about the nature of reality. These include a commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason as well as to a variety of idealism on which every explanation is within our epistemic reach. I argue that these commitments significantly constrain which metaphysical positions we can help ourselves to at the beginning of inquiry, as well as which questions we can coherently pursue.
Edited Collections
(forthcoming) Bloomsbury Handbook on Émilie du Châtelet. Bloomsbury Publishing.
(forthcoming) Principle of Sufficient Reason: A History. Oxford University Press. (Edited with Michael Della Rocca)
(2021) Issue of Philosophical Studies on the Principle of Sufficient Reason. (Guest Editor)